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Weber: Who's Responsible? Liability for the Deterioration of Properties

WHO'S RESPONSIBLE? LIABILITY FOR THE DETERIORATION
OF PROPERTIES ABANDONED DURING OR AFTER
FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS
William Weber
I. THE PROBLEM

Hausman v. City of Dayton presents an intriguing story.1 In 1981, an
Ohio partnership, J.V. Properties, purchased an industrial property from
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. 2 The partnership utilized the property for
the operations of Machinery Merchants International (MMI), an Ohio
corporation wholly owned by the partners of J.V. Properties.' In 1984,
MMI granted a security interest in its personal property to BancOhio
National Bank (BancOhio) to secure a debt of approximately $5.2
million.4 MMI soon defaulted, and as part of a liquidation agreement
with BancOhio, J.V. Properties agreed to convey a mortgage in the
industrial real property to BancOhio to provide additional collateral for
MMI's debts.5 In 1985, J.V. Properties defaulted and BancOhio filed an
action in Montgomery County to foreclose on the mortgage. The court
awarded a foreclosure judgment in favor of BancOhio,6 and BancOhio
moved for the county sheriff to offer the property for sale. However, no
bidders attended the December 1986 auction.7
The events up to this point in the case are commonplace in our legal
system. Essentially, a company granted a mortgage to a creditor, the
company defaulted on the mortgage, and then the creditor initiated a
foreclosure action against the company. This process is used routinely
throughout the United States. Unfortunately, the following chain of
events is all too common for distressed properties in foreclosure.
After the MMI property failed to sell at the foreclosure auction, all
parties involved essentially abandoned the property.8 The property was
1. The Supreme Court of Ohio's decision can be found at Hausman v. City of Dayton, 73 Ohio
St. 3d 671 (Ohio 1995). However, the preceding Second District Court of Appeal's decision, Hausman
v. City of Dayton, No. 13647, 1993 WL 541649 (Ohio Ct. App. 2d Dec. 22, 1993), contains a more
detailed description of the facts.
2. Hausman, 1993 WL 541649, at *2.
3. Id.
4. Id.
S. Id. At the time of this conveyance, J.V. Properties was not the sole owner and had sold a ten
percent interest in the property to a third party; however, that fact is not crucial to this illustration. Id.
6. Id. at *3. In a third agreement after the conveyance of the mortgage all three parties had
agreed that MMI was in default, foreclosure was the appropriate remedy, and that MMI or J.V.
Properties agreed not to assert a defense if a foreclosure suit was initiated by BancOhio. Id at *2-3.
7. Id. at *3.
8. Id.
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vandalized, looted, and stripped. 9 Several fires occurred at the site, and
an oil slick on a nearby creek was traced back to the site in 1987.1o The
Environmental Protection Agency inspected the property and found
In 1989, the City of
environmentally hazardous contamination.I'
Dayton declared the site a public nuisance and sought a determination
from the local Nuisance Appeals Board that BancOhio, as mortgagee,
and the other parties would be liable for the cost of abating the

nuisance.12
This story is one known all too well to many local governments in
Ohio. The initiation of a foreclosure action ignites a chain reaction
resulting in a property being neglected, vandalized, and abandoned. Too
often, the local jurisdiction is ultimately left to pay the bill to abate the
resulting public nuisance.
In the last several years, a "tsunami" of mortgage foreclosures hit
courts around the country, impacting communities soon after.' 3 In a
depressed real estate market, foreclosing banks could not sell the
foreclosed homes fast enough. To avoid the liability and cost of owning
these properties, foreclosing lenders looked for various ways to quickly
dispose of their interest. These methods included short sales, stalled
foreclosure actions, and abandonment of foreclosure actions, like in
Hausman.'4 The impacts of these foreclosures were increased levels of
neglect, blight, and abandonment.1 5 Though most of the resulting public
nuisances are not as extreme as the abandoned, environmentallycontaminated industrial site involved in Hausman, the impacts of
abandoned, vandalized houses literally hit much closer to home, and the
aggregate costs to local governments can be staggering.16
This Comment will attempt to answer the questions posed by
Hausman v. City of Dayton: Under Ohio law, who is responsible for the
costs associated with a property abandoned before the completion of a
foreclosure, and what can be done to remedy the root of the problem?
Part II of this Comment will explore the costs of vacancy and
abandonment to local jurisdictions. This Part will then analyze the link
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at *2-4.
13. Kermit J. Lind, The Perfect Storm: An Eyewitness Report from Ground Zero in Cleveland's
Neighborhoods, 17 J. AFFORDABLE Hous. & CMTY. DEV. LAW 237, 250 (2008).
14. Id. at 240.
15. See id at 238-39 (discussing the downward spiral of properties in Cleveland exacerbated by
the combination of unscrupulous subprime lending and subsequent "flipping" of properties by
prospectors).
16. Id. at 240 (estimating that the economic impact of the foreclosure crisis in the metropolitan
Cleveland area will be multibillions of dollars).
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between the foreclosure actions and increased levels of abandonment in
the context of the recent foreclosure crisis.
Part HI will explore one avenue that local jurisdictions all over the
country, including Ohio, have begun to embrace: the Vacant Property
Registration Ordinance (VPRO).
This Part will look to the
constitutionality of these ordinances within the context of the United
States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution. Additionally, Part III will
analyze, under the Ohio Home Rule Amendment, the potential conflict
between Ohio Revised Code § 1.63, which is a broadly-worded
provision claiming state level preemption of local attempts to regulate
lenders, and local VPROs that target foreclosing mortgagees.
Part IV will look to Ohio law to ascertain a mortgagee's and lender's
liability for the effects of a foreclosure action and a foreclosing
mortgagee's duty to maintain property. This analysis will begin with the
history of mortgage law and the duties owed by a mortgagee at common
law. This analysis concludes that by extending the common law
doctrine of "mortgagee in possession" it would be possible to find a
mortgagee liable for maintenance of the property and associated
nuisance abatement costs.
Finally, Part V concludes that the best solution for all parties involved
is to use the extension of the mortgagee in possession doctrine in
conjunction with a reasonable VPRO. This proposed solution creates a
tenable system to share the cost burden of vacant properties between
local jurisdictions and mortgagees, incentivize reasonable lending
practices, and protect neighborhoods from the negative effects of
abandoned property.
II. THE LINK BETWEEN FORECLOSURE AND BLIGHT
A. Getting to Vacant

Due to a confluence of factors, Ohio was one of the states hit hardest
by the recent foreclosure crisis. 7 Ohio ranked sixth in the number of
foreclosures in 2009, with over 89,000 filed.' 8 The Ohio market
conditions that attracted subprime lenders, whose practices largely
contributed to the foreclosure crisis, are the same conditions that
amplified the negative effects of the crisis itself.19 Those conditions
found in Ohio's main urban centers include an older housing stock and
decades of shifting population and industry from the urban core to
17. See Brandon Rehkopf, Saving the American Dream in Ohio: Crafting Incentives and
Disincentives to Promote a Responsible Foreclosure Process, 43 U. TOL. L. REv. 437, 437 (2012).
18. Id.
19. Lind, supranote 13, at 238.
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surrounding suburbs or out of state. 20 As the more economically stable
or affluent populations moved to the surrounding suburbs, urban
neighborhoods experienced the effects of disinvestment. 2'
This
disinvestment can quickly lead to vacancy and abandonment. 22
Before the economic crisis, the market created a fertile breeding
ground for predatory loans and property speculators.2 3 Low real estate
values in distressed inner city neighborhoods provided opportunities for
low-income individuals, often people of color, to purchase affordable
homes with mortgages. However, frequently the terms of the loans were
predatory or unsustainable.2 4 Additionally, to some these same market
conditions and the available credit were seen as business opportunities.
Investors would purchase low-value, dilapidated homes, undertake
inexpensive cosmetic repairs, and sell the homes as if fully
rehabilitated.2 5 Unwitting buyers would purchase the homes using the
available credit, but the terms made default highly likely.26 All of these
issues deepened the impact of the looming foreclosure crisis.
In Ohio, a foreclosure action can take years to wind its way through
the court system from the original filing, to sale at auction, to the
confirmation of the sale.27 The delay results from numerous factors
including notice requirements, equitable mortgagor protections, and an
overburdened judicial system.2 8 The longer a foreclosure takes, the
more likely the property will become vacant. 29 Even if the property
does not become vacant during the foreclosure, a property owner facing
loss of ownership through foreclosure is highly unlikely to invest any
substantial amount of time or money in the property. After this period
of neglect, the value of the home drops, and the cost of rehabilitating it
increases, which makes returning the home to a pre-foreclosure state
less economically feasible. 30 If at any point in the foreclosure process
the owner determines that the value of the home is not worth the debt
20. See id.
2 1. See id.
22. See Thomas Gunton, Coping with the Specter of Urban Malaise in a Postmodern Landscape:
The Need for a Detroit Land Bank Authority, 84 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 521, 521-23 (2007)
(discussing the impact of population shifts on urban centers and the broad array of costs associated with
the ensuing vacancy).
23. See Lind, supranote 13, at 238-39.
24. See id at 239.
25. See id at 238-39.
26. Rehkopf, supra note 17, at 439.
27. Lind, supra note 13, at 239.
28. For example, the statutory right of redemption in Ohio can only be foreclosed after the
confirmation ofa sale held by the county sheriff. OHIO REV. CODE § 2329.33 (West 2012).
29. Joseph Schilling, Code Enforcement and Community Stabilization: The Forgotten First
Responders to Vacant and ForeclosedHomes, 2 ALB. GOV'T L. REv. 101, 109 (2009).
30. Lind, supranote 13, at 239.
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owed-also known as "underwater"-then it does not make economic
sense to try to make payments on the home. Instead, abandoning the
debt-laden asset becomes the most rational economic decision.3 1
In states requiring judicial foreclosure, the sheer number of
foreclosure cases flooding the court system exacerbates the problems
created by foreclosures by extending the length of time it takes to finish
the suit.32 Additionally, rental properties tend to have higher rates of
abandonment compared to owner-occupied properties since the tenants
can move to another rental unit if the condition of the property begins to

decline. 33

B. The Cost
Once a property becomes vacant, its condition and value can rapidly
deteriorate.
Older homes are particularly susceptible to rapid
deterioration since they require more maintenance. A vacant property
can soon cause problems for the local jurisdiction, the entity usually
responsible for nuisance abatement. Vacant properties devour local
government resources by consuming more city services. One study
found that in 2008, vacant and abandoned properties cost eight Ohio
cities over $15 million in services, which included code enforcement
costs, demolition, securing the building, property maintenance, and

police and fire runs.34 Even more troubling is the loss in revenue that
results from abandoned buildings, which totaled $49 million amongst
the seven cities for which data was available.35 Therefore, abandoned
properties eat up the government resources and undercut the revenues of
the same jurisdiction.
However, the true costs of a vacant, abandoned property cannot be
measured just in maintenance expenses, the costs must account for the
property's negative impact on surrounding properties.3 6 One study
31. See Rehkopf, supra note 17, 440. Additionally, if a home is "underwater" then this could
also incentivize the owner to purposefully default on the loan. Id.
32. Memorandum from James C. Smith, Prof. at the Univ. of Georgia School of Law, to the
Drafting Committee for the Uniform Residential Real Estate Mortgage Foreclosure and Process and
Protections
Act,
p.1
(May
17,
2012),
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/mortgage%20foreclosure/8_2012mayl 7RREMFPPAbando
ned%20and%2OVacant/o2OProperties%20memoSmith.pdf.
33. Id
34. Schilling, supra note 29, at 111.
35. Id.
36. In Fifth Urban, Inc. v. Bd. of Bldg. Standards, 320 N.E.2d 727, 736-737 (Ohio App. Ct. 8th
Dist. 1974), the court summarized the negative impacts that an abandoned, vacant structure can have on
surrounding properties:
[I]f upon inspection it is determined by the Commissioner that a building no longer complies
with the building code and the conditions of its occupancy permit, the occupancy permit may be
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conducted in Philadelphia found that properties within a close proximity
to a vacant structure lose up to $7,672 in value.37 This loss in value has
multiple impacts ranging from falling property tax revenues to decreases
in the ability to resell. 38 Accounts of the "broken window theory" are
well established, and the costs associated with a single vacant home can
easily multiply when the values of surrounding homes fall to the point at
which these too become vacant and require additional resources. 39
Increases in criminal activity also correlate with increased vacancy,
which can then influence not only property values but also community
perceptions. 40
A direct link between foreclosures and vacancy is difficult to
document because the reasons for abandonment differ for each
individual property. When a building becomes vacant, the exact reason
for and time of vacancy are generally not recorded. In one study
conducted in 2008, twenty-eight percent of responding mayors
concluded that efforts to combat vacant and abandoned buildings had
lost ground since the foreclosure crisis began. 4 1 Even with the difficulty
of producing direct evidence in individual cases, the link between the
foreclosing parties and abandonment is obvious to local jurisdictions
who are on the ground dealing with the effects.

revoked and the building vacated. This then places the owner in a dilemma of whether to repair
the building or leave it vacant and unoccupied. If he repairs the building and then complies with
the building code, it can then be occupied and an occupancy permit will be issued. If the owner
does not makes the repairs the building cannot be occupied and it will remain vacant. In this
condition the building will then become a target for vandals and ultimately become an 'unsafe
structure' and then the building will either have to be repaired or demolished . . . . Sound
business practices would dictate that the owner of the building would repair it immediately upon
being notified that the building does not comply with the building code . . . . However, in
changing urban times buildings no longer have economic vitality or viability, the owner may
decide that the costs of repairs exceed the economic value to him, and he will choose to leave the
building vacant until such times as conditions change.
As a result, urban centers are becoming vast wastelands. Unfortunately, the remaining property
owners who want to maintain their property are at a disadvantage and they become an island of
despair surrounded by a sea of despair. One nuisance attracts another. When one building
becomes vacant and vandalized, is it is contagious and before long the entire neighborhood
suffers the same fate.
37. E. Pa. Organizing Project, Temp. U. Center for Public Policy, & Diamond & Associates,
Blight Free Philadelphia:A Public Private Strategy to Create and Enhance Neighborhood Value 21
(Philadelphia, Pa.), Oct. 2001 [hereinafter BlightFree Philadelphia].
38. See Schilling, supranote 29, at 110-11.
39. See Blight Free Philadelphia,supra note 37.
40. Schilling, supra note 29, at 110.
41. UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, VACANT AND ABANDONED PROPERTIES:
at
available
3
(2008),
PRACTICES
1,
BEST
SURVEY
AND
http://www.usmayors.org/bestpractices/vacantproperties08.pdf.
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C. The Litigation
The impacts of foreclosure and the costs of vacancy have not gone
unnoticed by local jurisdictions, and several jurisdictions have been

proactive in filing various claims in an effort to hold mortgage lenders
responsible.
In one telling example, the State of California and the City of Los
Angeles filed a joint public nuisance lawsuit against Deutsche Bank

National Trust Company and its various subsidiaries (Deutsche Bank)
claiming that these subsidiaries had become "two of the largest, if not
the largest, slumlords in the City of Los Angeles.'A 2 The complaint
argued that by purchasing mortgage loans, bundling them into securities,
selling those securities to investors, and then acting as trustees for these
securities, Deutsche Bank effectuated low-maintenance sources of
income derived from servicing the mortgages, accepting the mortgage
payments, and directing the mortgage payments to the shareholders.4 3
Though this setup functioned well when the housing market was strong
and the underlying mortgagors made timely payments, the complaint
claimed that the foreclosure crisis caused a spike in defaults which in
turn "transformed defendants from detached investment brokers and
trustees to large scale residential property owners...."
The complaint
further alleged that Deutsche Bank took title to over 2,000 residential
properties but failed to maintain the properties in compliance with state
and local law and at times illegally evicted tenants to increase the
market value of the properties. 45 The suit argued that because of
Deutsche Bank's actions numerous properties became public
nuisances.46
The City of Cleveland, Ohio, a city that has experienced some of the
worst effects of the foreclosure crisis, 47 attacked lenders not just for
neglecting property maintenance but for the underlying method of
lending that led to the foreclosure crisis and ensuing vacant property
issues. In City of Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mortgage Securities, Inc.,

Cleveland unsuccessfully attempted to hold various financial entities
accountable for the foreclosure crisis by claiming the practice of
subprime lending and securitization of those mortgages was a public
nuisance. 48

42. Cal. v. Deutsche Bank Nat'1 Trust Co., No. BC460878, 2011 WL 1663038 (Cal. Super. Ct.
L.A. May 4, 2011).
43. Id. at IN 4-5.
44. Id at 5.
45. See id.
at IM5-13.
46. Id. at IMl1-14.
47. See Lind, supranote 13, at 237.
48. City of Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mortg. Sec., Inc., 615 F.3d 496, 499 (6th Cir. 2010).
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Affected local governments around the country have used other legal
tactics to try to pin liability on lenders. In Buffalo, New York, a
prosecutor has successfully sought to hold lenders accountable under
criminal public nuisance claims.4 9 In another example, the City of
Baltimore, Maryland filed suit against Wells Fargo under the Federal
Fair Housing Act claiming that the lending practices had a negative
disparate impact on African-American neighborhoods.50
These lawsuits illustrate the difficulty in placing responsibility on
lenders that avoid taking legal title. The concept of legal title can
deviate sharply from common perceptions of ownership or control. For
example, an owner, untrained in foreclosure and real property law, may
decide to abandon a property during the foreclosure proceeding under
the assumption that the mortgagor will soon have title. The foreclosing
party may continue the foreclosure but stop short of taking legal title."
Furthermore, since many mortgages were bundled, securitized, and sold
on secondary markets, mortgage transactions became much more
complex and involved many different parties. 52 This complex web of
participants allowed individual players to shift guilt and dodge claims of
legal ownership and responsibility for properties. 5 3
D. The Results
The connections between foreclosure and vacancy are real but often
difficult to discern. At times the link is as simple as a lender
foreclosing, taking title to the property, and evicting occupants. Other
times, the process may resemble more of a "vacancy by a thousand pin
pricks" in which a combination of hastily issued loans with
unscrupulous terms and an overvalued property led an "underwater"
owner to walk away from the property once served with a foreclosure
suit. Not only are the connections real, but so are the costs. With
demolition bills mounting, local governments began to look beyond
litigation for alternative methods to deal with the crisis they faced.

49. Creola Johnson, Fight Blight: Cities Sure to Hold Lenders Responsible for the Rise in
ForeclosureandAbandonedProperties,2008 UTAH L. REv. 1169, 1195-96 (2008).
50. Id. at 1198-99.
51. See id. at 1186 (stating that a common strategy used by lenders is to buy the foreclosed
property at a foreclosure sale but never record the deed).
52. Id. at 1184 (claiming that mortgage transactions now involve "the borrower, the mortgage
broker, the intermediate bank, the investment trust, the servicer, the rating agency, investors, trustees,
and the credit enhancement provider") (internal citation omitted).
53. City of Cincinnati v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 897 F. Supp. 2d 633, 638 (S.D. Ohio
Oct. 10, 2012) ("[The defendants, Deutsche Bank and several subsidiaries,] concede that they act as
trustees for certain residential mortgage-backed securitization trusts that do own properties in the City,
but they note that any such interest is held solely in their capacity as Trustees of those trusts.").
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III. VACANT FORECLOSED PROPERTY REGISTRATION ORDINANCES

A. The Challenge
Described as "first responders," local jurisdictions' code enforcement
departments are usually the ones on the front lines observing the impacts
and effects of vacancy and abandonment.54 As the foreclosure crisis
worsened and abandonment issues deepened, a groundswell of defensive
activity at the local level sought to hold lenders and owners accountable
for the costs of maintaining foreclosed property or abating resulting
nuisances. 55
Local code enforcement processes are typically based on the
assumption that a physical owner either lives on-site, in the best-case
scenario, or is reachable by searching the county records for a mailing
address, in the worst-case scenario.56 This assumption is exemplified by
the fact that notice of a violation, the most basic and important
communication between code enforcement officials and owners,
frequently takes the form of a notice mailed to the owner of record or
orders physically posted on the property.5 7 However, these forms of
communication are not compatible with abandoned properties, partially
completed foreclosures, and securitized mortgages held by shareholders
scattered throughout the world. As a result, code enforcement
departments are left to grapple with the difficulty of alerting the
appropriate party about violations.
For example, the securitization of mortgages exacerbates this problem
through frequent transfer of ownership and servicing rights which
usually requires a document custodian.5 8 The Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems, Inc., along with other affiliated entities, (MERS)
provides this service for many securitized mortgages. 59 The MERS
system facilitates the transfer of mortgages on the secondary market by
allowing lenders to list MERS as the mortgagee in the local county
records as opposed to the actual mortgagee.6 0 This practice relieves
lenders of the need to file mortgage assignments for each transfer. 61
Unfortunately, the identity of the actual lender is not recorded, which
leaves local code enforcement with little direction in the local property
54. Schilling, supra note 29, at 103-04.
55. Smith, supra note 32, pt. I, at 2.
56. Schilling, supra note 29, at 121.
57. E.g. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 17980.6 (West 2013); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 810/2
(West 2013); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 62.17 (West 2013).
58. Johnson, supra note 49, at 1185.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

9

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 13

672

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 82

records.62
B. A Solution?
In response to the issues arising from vacant, foreclosed properties,
local jurisdictions are increasingly turning to Vacant Property
Registration Ordinances (VPRO) for assistance.6 3 Local governments
commonly use registration or licensing schemes to assist in the
regulation and enforcement of their police powers.6 4 For example, many
jurisdictions require some sort of rental property registration to ensure
that rental accommodations are safe and sanitary.6 5 Ohio jurisdictions
are increasingly enacting VPROs. According to one comprehensive
online database, at least sixty-five Ohio jurisdictions have VPROs, and
approximately half of those have been enacted or revised since 2006.66
VPROs come in two general types: (1) the classic VPRO that regulates
all vacant structures and (2) the VPRO that targets properties involved
This Comment will focus primarily on the second
in a foreclosure.
type: the VPRO that targets foreclosure properties. Though significant
variation exists at the local level, most VPROs contain a registration
process, a violation notification system, minimum progerty maintenance
standards, a fee schedule, and penalties for violations.
Chula Vista, California, one of the fastest growing cities in San Diego
County was one of the first local governments to adapt the VPRO to the
problems presented by the foreclosure crisis.69 Adopted in 2007, Chula
Vista's VPRO attempts to maintain existing property values by
requiring mortgage lenders to inspect defaulted properties to determine
if the property is occupied.o If unoccupied, the mortgage lender must
adequately maintain the property and landscaping, hire a local company
to perform weekly inspections, post a telephone number on the property
for a twenty-four hour contact at the company, and pay a seventy-dollar
registration fee. 7' In the last several years, Ohio jurisdictions have
62. Id.
63. Timothy A. Davis, A ComparativeAnalysis of State and Local Government Vacant Property
RegistrationStatutes, 44 URB. LAW. 399,400 (2012).
64. See Schilling, supranote 29, at 129-30.
65. Id.
66. SAFEGUARD PROPERTIES, http://www.safeguardproperties.com/Resources/Vacant Property
Registration/OH.aspx?filter=vpr (last visited Jan. 8, 2014).
67. See Schilling, supranote 29, at 130-31.
68. Tyler Mulligan, Toward A Comprehensive ProgramFor Regulating Vacant or Abandoned
Dwellings in North Carolina: The General Police Power, Minimum Housing Standards, and Vacant
PropertyRegistration,32 CAMPBELL L. REv. 1, 40-41 (2009).
69. Schilling, supranote 29, at 142-43.
70. Id.
71. Id
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followed suit by either amending their existing VPROs or enacting new
ordinances that target foreclosing lenders.72 Whether this new type of
local ordinance is constitutional remains an open question in Ohio.
C. Constitutionalityof VPROs
1. Ohio Police Powers
The Tenth Amendment reserves all powers not delegated to the
federal government for the states.73 Without question, the police power
to protect the health and safety of its citizens was reserved for the
states. 74
In Ohio, for an ordinance to be a constitutional use of the police
powers, it must have a real and substantial relation to the health, safety,
morals, or general welfare of the public and cannot be unreasonable or
arbitrary.75 Additionally, legislative enactments exercising the police
powers enjoy a presumption of constitutionality. 76
VPROs primarily focus on regulations protecting public health and
safety, which are at the heart of the police powers. The Supreme Court
of Ohio has held that the police powers may be used to justify the
destruction or abatement of a public nuisance.77 Building codes are
some of the oldest and most widely accepted products of the police
powers.7 8 VPROs take preventative measures by strictly enforcing
building codes and requiring additional actions for buildings that are
dangerously close to becoming public nuisances.
2. Ohio Home Rule
Traditionally, states are given wide latitude to exercise these police
powers because health and safety are matters of primarily local
concern. 79 Ohio, along with a majority of other states, is a home rule
state.8 0 The Ohio Home Rule Amendment grants to Ohio municipalities
72. SAFEGUARD PROPERTIES, supra note 66. See CINCINNATI, OHIO CODE § 1123 (2013).
73. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
74. Raich v. Gonzalez, 500 F.3d 850, 867 (9th Cir. 2007).
75. Downing v. Cook, 69 Ohio St. 2d 149, 150 (Ohio 1982).
76. Id.
77. Fifth Urban, Inc. v. Bd. of Bldg. Standards, 320 N.E.2d 727, 733 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist.
1974) (citing Lindsay v. Cincinnati, 172 Ohio St. 137 (Ohio 1961)).
78. Id. at 398.
79. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996).
80. Mulligan, supra note 68, at 12; OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3. In Ohio there are several
possible variations of local government, including counties and townships; however, this comment will
analyze the home rule amendment only in the context of municipal corporations. Hereinafter, the term
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the "authority to exercise all powers of local self-government and to
adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and
other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws." 8'
Therefore, a local government is granted the sovereignty to exercise the
state's police power, subject to conflicting state laws and constitutional
limits.
Courts resolve conflicts under the Home Rule Amendment using a
three-part, conjunctive test. A state statute takes precedence over a
local ordinance when (1) the ordinance is an exercise of the police
power, rather than of local self-government; (2) the ordinance is in
conflict with the statute; and (3) the statute is a general law.84
The first step is to determine whether the local ordinance is related to
self-governance or is an exercise of the police power. If the ordinance
relates solely to self-government, the analysis goes no further, since the
Ohio Constitution authorizes a municipality to exercise all powers of
local self-government within its jurisdiction.85 Ordinances relating to
self-government must "relate solely to the government and
administration of the internal affairs of the municipality."8 6 Conversely,
ordinances related to the police powers do not demand the same
deference. Instead, while local governments may enact regulations to
protect the health, safety, morals, and the general welfare of the public, 87
these police-power ordinances must yield to state law if a conflict

exists.
The second step of the Home Rule analysis is to determine if a
conflict exists between the state law and the local ordinance or, in other
words, whether "the ordinance permits or licenses that which the statute
forbids and prohibits, [or] vice versa." 89 The Supreme Court of Ohio
has also developed a "conflict-by-implication test." 90 This test holds
that if state law determines and states specific illegal behavior, then the

local government or jurisdiction will refer to municipal corporations.
81. OHIO CONST. art XVIII, § 3.
82. Brett Altier, MunicipalPredatoryLending Regulation in Ohio: The DisproportionateImpact
ofPreemptionon Ohio's Cities, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 125, 139 (2011).
83. Marich v. Bob Bennett Const. Co., 116 Ohio St. 3d 553, 555 (Ohio 2008). Ohio courts have
not consistently analyzed the three parts in a particular order so this Comment will present them in the
most logical sequence for this analysis.
84. Id. (citing Canton v. State, 94 Ohio St. 3d 149 (Ohio 2005)).
85. Am. Financial Servs. Assn. v. Cleveland, 112 Ohio St. 3d 170, 173 (Ohio 2006).
86. Marich, 116 Ohio St. 3d at 556 (citing Beachwood v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 167
Ohio St. 369 (Ohio 1958)).
87. Id. (citing Downing v. Cook, 69 Ohio St.2d 149, 150 (Ohio 1982)).
88. Id. (citing Am. FinancialServs. Assn., 112 Ohio St.3d at 123).
89. Id. at 560 (citing Struthers v. Sokol, 108 Ohio St. 263 (Ohio 1923)).
90. Am. FinancialSerys. Assn., 112 Ohio St. 3d at 177-78.
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implication that behavior not offending the state statute is legal arises.9'
Therefore, if a local ordinance prohibits this implicitly legal behavior
then the local ordinance is in conflict with the state law.92
The third step of the Home Rule Amendment test is to determine if
the state statute is a general law. This analysis includes a four-part
test-the Canton test-that requires a statute meet all the following
criteria:
(1) [B]e part of a statewide and comprehensive legislative enactment, (2)
apply to all parts of the state alike and operate uniformly throughout the
state, (3) set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations, rather than
purport only to grant or limit legislative power of a municipal corporation
to set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations, and (4) prescribe a rule
of conduct upon citizens generally. 93
3. The Potential Conflict and Analysis
Any municipality enacting a VPRO could potentially create a conflict
with Ohio Revised Code (ORC) § 1.63. The pertinent part of the
provision reads as follows:
(A) The state solely shall regulate the business of originating, granting,
servicing, and collecting loans and other forms of credit in the state and
the manner in which any such business is conducted, and this regulation
shall be in lieu of all other regulation of such activities by any municipal
corporation or other political subdivision.
(B) Any ordinance, resolution, regulation, or other action by a municipal
corporation or other political subdivision to regulate, directly or
indirectly, the origination, granting, servicing, or collection of loans or
other forms of credit constitutes a conflict with the Revised Code,
including, but not limited to, Titles XI, XIII, XVII, and XLVII, and with
the uniform operation throughout the state of lending and other credit
provisions, and is preempted.
(C) Any ordinance, resolution, regulation, or other action by a municipal
corporation or other political subdivision constitutes a conflict with the
Revised Code, including, but not limited to, Titles XI, XIII, XVII, and
XLVII, and is pre-empted, if the ordinance, resolution, regulation, or
other action does either of the following:
(1) Disqualifies a person, or its subsidiaries or affiliates, from doing
business with such municipal corporation or other political subdivision
9 1. See id.
92. See id.
93. Canton v. State, 94 Ohio St. 3d 149, 153 (Ohio 2005).
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based upon the acts or practices of such person, or its subsidiaries or
affiliates, as an originator, grantor, servicer, or collector of loans or other
forms of credit;
(2) Imposes reporting requirements or other obligationsupon a person, or
its subsidiaries or affiliates, based upon such person's, or its subsidiaries'
or affiliates', acts or practices as an originator, grantor, servicer, or
collector of loans or other forms of credit. 94
The first step in the analysis is to determine if the ordinance is related
to local self-government or is an exercise of the police powers. If
passed by a local government, a VRPO will be purely an exercise of
police powers for the safety and health of the local government's
citizens. The principle rationale behind VRPOs is to mitigate or avoid
the harm that vacant properties can cause to neighborhoods and
people.95
The second step is to determine if a conflict exists between the local
ordinance and the state law. In order to understand the conflict with
ORC § 1.63, it is necessary to look to the provision's genesis.
In February 2002, the Ohio Legislature passed House Bill 386 (HB
386).96 The bill added two new sections to the Ohio Revised Code,
ORC § 1.63 and ORC §§ 1349.25 to 1349.37.97 The bulk of the bill
incorporated the federal Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of
1994 (HOEPA) into state law. 8 HOEPA requires lenders to make
disclosures to mortgagors on certain loans and prevents certain specific
terms, like balloon payments, which make repayment especially
difficult.99 HOEPA is part of the Truth in Lending Act, a broad
consumer protection law that regulates various forms of consumer credit
by requiring meaningful disclosure of credit terms. 00 Ironically, the
impetus for HB 386 did not come from a groundswell of consumer
protection activists but instead from the mortgage industry itself.'o' In
fact, at one of the early hearings on the bill, several mortgage industry
94. OHIO REV. CODE § 1.63 (West 2013) (emphasis added).
95. Even the preservation of property values is a valid reason to exercise the police powers.
Fifth Urban, Inc. v. Bd. of Bldg. Standards, 320 N.E.2d 727, 733 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. 1974).
96. H.B. 386, 124th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2002).
97. Am. FinancialSerys. Assn., 112 Ohio St. 3d at 170.
98. Id.; OHIO REV. CODE § 1349.32 (West 2013).
99. S. Rep. No. 103-169, at 21 (1993) ("The bill amends the Truth in Lending Act. . .. To
ensure that consumers understand the terms of such loans and are protected from high pressure sales
tactics, the legislation requires . . . disclosure [of terms] three days before consummation of the
transaction. The bill also prohibits . .. including certain terms such as prepayment penalties and balloon
payments that have proven particularly problematic.").
100. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2012).
101. Report on Second Hearing of HB 386 on October 11, 2001, Hannah Capital Connection,
www.hannah.com (Oct. 11, 2001).
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groups spoke in favor of the bill while a representative from the Legal
Aid Society of Dayton, Ohio spoke against it.102 The reason for this
paradox is that as introduced, HB 386 contained only the ORC § 1.63
amendment and none of the consumer protections. 0 3
Since consumer protection was obviously not the original driving
force behind the bill, what was the driving force? The real story behind
the bill likely starts when the City of Dayton, Ohio enacted Ordinance
No. 29990-01 in July 2001.' The ordinance prohibited certain lending
practices deemed predatory, placed restrictions on predatory lenders
operating in Dayton, and provided a cause of action for injured parties to
bring civil actions to avoid or correct predatory loans. 0 5 With this
knowledge, the reasoning behind the original introduction of HB 386
just three months later becomes clear: The mortgage industry sought to
insulate itself from liability under predatory lending ordinances similar
to those enacted in Dayton.' 06 However, the story does not end there.
HB 386 passed in the House of Representatives unamended; however,
when the bill reached the Senate committee stage, it underwent a drastic
reformation.' 07 It began to take the form of the bill that was actually
passed and which has since been called Ohio's Predatory Lending
Act.'0 8 After passing in the Senate, the substituted bill returned to the
House and was passed again in its new form.' 09 It should be noted that
though the bill originally introduced and the one eventually adopted by
the Legislature are completely different, the language in ORC § 1.63 did
not materially change, and therefore, we are left wrestling with a code
provision written for one purpose, but endorsed and passed for another:

102. Id. ("Representatives from the Ohio Consumer Finance Association, the Ohio Bankers
Association, Ohio Association of Mortgage Brokers, the Ohio Mortgage Bankers, Ohio Credit Union
League, and the Ohio League of Financial Institutions testified as proponents. . . . Speaking in
opposition to the bill were Stanley Hirtle, Legal Aid Society of Dayton. . . .").
103. Jana R. Vawter, Legislative Service Commission, Bill Analysis H.B. 386 124th Gen.
Assemb. (As Introduced) (2001).
104. Dayton v. State, 813 N.E.2d 707, 740 (Ohio Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2004).
105. Id.
106. HB 386 was introduced by Representative Chuck Blasdel. Senate Finance Committee
Hearing of HB 386 on January 8, 2002, Hannah Capital Connection, www.hannah.com (Jan. 8, 2002).
Representative Blasdel, a Republican, represented the First District of Ohio in the Ohio House of
Representatives from 2001 to 2006. When he ran for Congress in 2006 the Real Estate industry, which
encompasses mortgage lenders, was the largest single industrial contributor to his campaign. Ohio
District
06
Race:
Top
Industries,
2006
Race,
OPENSECRETS.ORG
http://www.opensecrets.org/races/indus.php?cycle=2006&id=0H06 (last visited Jan. 8, 2014).
107. See Jennifer A. Parker, Legislative Service Commission, Bill Analysis Sub. H.B. 386 124th
Gen. Assemb. (As Reported by S. Finance & Financial Institutions) (2002).
108. Dayton, 813 N.E.2d at 711.
109. Hannah News Services, Inc., Capitol Connection for HB386, 124th General Assembly,
Capitol Connection, available at http://www.rotundacollection.com.
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the protection of Ohio residents from predatory lending."10
To fully understand the potential conflict, it is important to take a
scrupulous look at the statute's language. The statute is written in very
broad terms, and the potential conflict for requiring a license for a
vacant foreclosed property arises from the language, "[t]he state solely
shall regulate the business of.

.

. collecting loans. . . " or alternatively,

"[a]ny ordinance ... by a municipal corporation ... is pre-empted, if the
ordinance . .. [i]mposes reporting requirements or other obligations
upon [a lender] . .. .""' Despite being very broad, the language of the

statute does have some limits. For instance, the provision does not free
lending institutions from the need to obey local zoning ordinances or
building codes. However the question remains: Where is the line?
The statutory language itself offers several clues that point toward the
conclusion that HB 386 and its addition of ORC § 1.63 was solely
intended to prohibit ordinances, like the City of Dayton's, that attempt
to specifically regulate loan terms issued within a local government's
First, the statute explicitly mentions pre-emption in
boundaries."
"Titles XI, XIII, XVII, and XLVII."" 3 Title IX covers financial
institutions generally and regulates their operation within the State."'
Title XIII contains regulations for consumer transactions, includinp the
Ohio Uniform Commercial Code, which excludes real property" and
consumer protection laws."' 6 Title XVII regulates corporations and
partnerships.' '1 Finally, Title XLVII regulates occupations." 8 Though
110. Id
111. OHIO REV. CODE § 1.63(A), (C) (West 2013).
112. CITY OF DAYTON, OHIO, REV. CODE OF GEN. ORD., § 112.40 (2013). The ordinance, before
being struck down by the Supreme Court in Am. FinancialServs. Assn. v. Cleveland, 112 Ohio St. 3d
170, (Ohio 2006), attempted to regulate high cost loans defined as the following:
A loan that is secured by residential real property located within the City of Dayton on which
there is situated a dwelling for not more than four families or a condominium unit, if:
(1) At any time over the life of the loan, the annual percentage rate of the loan equals or exceeds
by more than nine percentage points, or the current annual percentage rate limitation included
within the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act ("HOEPA"), whichever is less, the yield
on Treasury securities having comparable periods of maturity to the loan maturity as of the
fifteenth day of the month immediately preceding the month in which the application for the
extension of credit is received by the creditor; or,
(2) The total points and fees financed in such loan equal or exceed the: (a) Points and fees
limitation included with the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act ("HOEPA"), or ,[] (b)
Five percent of the total loan amount; or, six percent of the loan amount if the total transaction
amount is $20,000.00 or more and the loan is a purchase money loan guaranteed by the Federal
Housing Administration or the Veterans Administration, whichever is less.
Id.
113. OHIO REV. CODE § 1.63(B), (C) (West 2013).
114. See OHIO REV. CODE §§ 1101-1181 (West 2013).
115. See OHIO REV. CODE § 1309.109(D)(11) (West 2013).
116. See OHIO REV. CODE § 1349 (West 2013).
117. See OHIO REV. CODE §§ 1701-1785 (West 2013).
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ORC § 1.63 includes language not limiting the pre-emptive effect to
these titles alone, it provides clues as to what the law ultimately
intended to regulate. For example, noticeably absent from this list is
Title XXXVI, which allows the state to regulate health, safety, and
morals." 9 Under this title, the state provides significant guidance and
regulation to local jurisdictions in exercising the police powers. ORC
§ 1.63(C) also provides direction by specifically enumerating the type of
local ordinance that would be in conflict with the provision. 120 ORC
§ 1.63(C)(1) prohibits a municipality from disqualifying a lender from
doing business with the municipality because of its other acts as a
lender.121 This subsection is no doubt a direct answer to a provision in
the Dayton ordinance that prohibited city contracts from being awarded
to predatory lenders.' 22 Another provision prevents local jurisdictions
from implementing reporting requirements or "other obligations" for
lenders.' 3 Reporting requirements in consumer protection legislation
generally involve required disclosures to a regulating government entity
to improve and facilitate enforcement.' 24 The modifying phrase "or
other obligations" should then be cabined to similar reporting
requirements.
Finally, the story of the bill in its entirety clearly shows the legislative
intent behind ORC § 1.63. By the time it was signed into law, ORC
§ 1.63 had gone from being the entire bill to simply being an affirmation
that Ohio's Predatory Lending Act would preempt local attempts to
regulate predatory lending. Though this may not be clear from ORC
§ 1.63 in isolation, "the [] sections of HB 386 do not exist in a vacuum.
They must be considered in conjunction with the rest of HB 386. And
once that occurs, the applicable test requires that the state statute be
compared with the local ordinance to see whether conflict exists."l 25 As
the Supreme Court of Ohio stated in American Financial Services

Association v. Cleveland, the legislative intent behind HB 386 was to
"preempt municipal regulation and occupy the field of regulation of
predatory lending as an issue of statewide concern." 26 The intent was
not to prevent local jurisdictions from enacting an ordinance requiring
registration by a party filing a foreclosure on a vacant property, and
§§ 4701-4799 (West 2013).
§§ 3701-3798 (West 2013).
See OHIO REV. CODE § 1.63(C) (West 2013).
OHIO REV. CODE § 1.63(C)(1) (West 2013).

118. See OHIO REV. CODE
119. See OHIO REV. CODE
120.

121.

§ 112.43(B) (2013).
OHIo REV. CODE § 1.63(C)(2) (West 2013).
See Darryl E. Getter, Cong. Research Serv., RL34720, Reporting Issues Under the Home
Disclosure Act 3 (2008).
Dayton v. State, 813 N.E.2d 707, 724 (Ohio Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2004).
Am. Financial Servs. Assn. v. Cleveland, 112 Ohio St. 3d 170, 175 (Ohio 2006).

122. CrrY OF DAYTON, OHIO, REV. CODE OF GEN. ORD.,

123.
124.
Mortgage
125.
126.
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therefore, no conflict should exist between ORC § 1.63 and local VRPO.
The third and final step in the Home Rule analysis is to determine if
ORC § 1.63 is a general law. The Supreme Court of Ohio has already
decided that through HB 386, the legislation that produced ORC § 1.63,
the Ohio legislature expressed its intent to "preempt municipal
regulation and occupy the field of regulating of predatory lending as an
issue of statewide concern." Therefore, the court determined that HB
386, as a whole, was a general law for purposes of the Home Rule
analysis of local predatory lending regulations.' 2 7 However, VPROs
focus on local concerns, which vary greatly from the context in which
HB 386 was previously interpreted. Though the analysis of ORC § 1.63
may not change drastically for three of the factors required by the
Canton test for general laws, the analysis does change for the remaining
factor which requires that a general law set forth police, sanitary, or
similar regulations "and not statutes which purport only to grant or to
limit the legislative powers of a municipal corporation to adopt or
enforce police, sanitary or other similar regulations."1 28 To read ORC
§ 1.63 to preempt local jurisdictions from enacting VPROs is
contradictory to this requirement. Neither ORC § 1.63 nor any other
part of HB 386 provides any mechanism at the state level for registration
of vacant properties going through foreclosure. Therefore if read to
preempt local VPROs, ORC § 1.63 would solely limit the legislative
powers of local governments without providing a state level solution to
the problem. As a result, in relation to VPROs, ORC § 1.63 should not
be read as a general law and therefore should not preempt local
jurisdictions from enacting vacant property registration ordinances
targeting foreclosures.
D. Conclusion
ORC § 1.63, as enacted, was intended to clarify that the predatory
lending protections passed concurrently in ORC § 1349 were meant to
preempt local jurisdictions from passing similar local ordinances. ORC
§ 1.63 was part of a compromise to provide consumers protections from
predatory lending while at the same time keeping lenders from having to
navigate a patchwork of local ordinances in order to do business in the
State of Ohio. However, ORC § 1.63 was not meant to preempt local
jurisdictions from passing VPROs. Preemption of VPROs by ORC
§ 1.63 fails under a Home Rule analysis because ORC § 1.63 cannot be
a general law when state law does not provide for a state-level VPRO.

127. Id.
128. Id.
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Nor was preemption the legislative intent, as shown by the legislative
history. VPRO ordinances are a powerful defensive tool for local
jurisdictions and are crucial to assisting local governments in their fight
on the front lines of abandonment, blight, and vacancy. Taking away
this tool when no state-level solution to deal effectively with the
problem exists would do great harm to local governments and
neighborhoods.
IV. FORECLOSING MORTGAGEE'S LIABILITY FOR NEGLECT UNDER OHIO
LAW
Though a functioning VPRO may assist local jurisdictions in
minimizing the damage caused by vacant and foreclosed properties, it
may be possible under the common law doctrine of mortgagee in
possession, recognized in Ohio, to hold mortgagees accountable for the
full cost of their foreclosure actions and incentivize lenders to consider
alternatives to foreclosure.129
A. The Common Law History

The term and concept of a mortgage developed in English law, but the
term is actually comprised of two French words, mort gage.13 0 The
literal translation of this phrase is the "dead pledge," and its opposing
phrase, vif gage translates to "live pledge."' 3' These terms derive from
the basic idea in early mortgages that the land underlying the transaction
would generate income to pay back the debt.132 Under a live pledge, the
creditor took possession and was required by contract to pay down the
principal of the debt with the income earned from the land.133 However,
under the dead pledge there was no such obligation. Instead, creditors
had a right to collect the full amount of the debt owed from the land's
income-income generated from the debtors' labor.' 34 Therefore, the
pledge was dead to the debtor.' 3 5 Furthermore, if the debtor did not pay
129. The modem mortgage lending industry is much more complex than just the mortgagee and
mortgagor. There are many parties involved including mortgage servicers, brokers, and trustees among
others; however, this comment, for the sake of argument and simplicity, will refer to all of these parties
as mortgagees.
130. Morris G. Shanker, Will Mortgage Law Survive? A Commentary and Critique on Mortgage
Law's Birth, Long Life, and Current Proposalsfor Its Demise, 54 CAsE W. RES. L. REV. 69, 70-71
(2003).
131. Id. at 71.
132. Id
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See id.
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back the full amount of the loan at the appropriate time, the debtor
essentially forfeited the property to the creditor. 3 Creditors obviously
preferred the mortgage as it was the dominant form found in early
mortgage transactions.'
However, the English courts of equity challenged the harshness of
this system and developed equitable doctrines to protect debtors, or the
mortgagors.' 3 8 One development was the right of redemption, which
granted the mortgagor the right to avoid a forfeiture by paying off the
debt owed within a given period after default.' 39 In the 17 th century,
another such development placed a mortgagee who took possession of
property from the mortgagor in the position of a trustee.1 0 As trustee
for the property, the mortgagee had certain fiduciary duties including
reasonable operation of the estate to generate profits and a requirement
to keep the mortgaged property in a proper state of repair to prevent
deterioration.14 1 As with many other English legal concepts, the
doctrine of mortgagee in possession surfaced in the common law of the
United States, including in Ohio.142
B. Ohio Law
Under Ohio law, legal title to a mortgaged property remains in the
mortgagor until a condition of the mortgage is broken. At that time,
legal title, as between the mortgagor and mort agee, vests with the
mortgagee subject to the equity of redemption.14 However, as to the
rest of the world, title remains in the mortgagor until (1) the mortgagee
forecloses on the mortgage and the sale is consummated, (2) the
mortgagee recovers possession of the property by ejectment
proceedings, or (3) the mortgagee otherwise extinguishes the right of the
mortgagor to redeem the property.144 If any of these conditions occur,
136. Id. at 72.
137. Id. at 70.
138. Id. at 72.
139. Id. at 75.
140. E. ST. CLAIR HARNET, A HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES 22 (Stevens & Sons,
1909).
141. Id. at 25.
142. Levin v. Carney, 161 Ohio St. 513, 519 (Ohio 1954) ("When a mortgagee goes into
possession by sufferance or consent he becomes a trustee for the mortgagor and those claiming under
the mortgagor. In such case the mortgagee is required to handle the mortgaged property in a provident
manner and to handle the income therefrom and apply the proceeds to the debts in the order of their
priority.").
143. Hausman v. Dayton, 73 Ohio St. 3d 671, 676 (Ohio 1995); See Levin, 161 Ohio St. at 520.
144. Hausman, 73 Ohio St. 3d at 676. The Supreme Court of Ohio is rephrasing the framework
initially laid out in Levin v. Carney which originally states the second option as "may maintain
ejectment or take other legal steps to obtain possession." Levin, 161 Ohio St. at 519.
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both equitable title and legal title are deemed to be in the hands of the
mortgagee. 145
In reality, the last two options are almost never exercised by
mortgagees. Mortgagees try to avoid becoming a mortgagee in
possession, because this position carries the duties of ownership as a
trustee but is still subject to the right of redemption. 146 This right of
redemption effectively prevents a mortgagee from disposing of the
property since theoretically the mortgagor could show up and redeem
the property at any time. Additionally, the mere extinguishing of the
right of redemption, standing alone, does not automatically allow for the
sale of the property, because no other liens or encumbrances are
extinguished, as in a foreclosure and sale. However, a mortgagee,
represented by competent counsel, is able to a walk the tight rope of
avoiding liability for properties even if its foreclosure is the cause of
vacancy and abandonment. For example, a mortgagee can begin a
foreclosure and walk away before the sale so that legal title does not
pass and the property is left in a legal limbo.14 7
To ground the impacts of these doctrines and practices in reality, a
return to the case of Hausman v. City of Dayton is appropriate. When
analyzing the facts of Hausman, the Second District Court of Appeals of
Ohio (Second District) made one crucial assumption that the Supreme
Court of Ohio refused to recognize. The Dayton ordinance in question
included "mortgagees" in its definition of parties responsible for the cost
of nuisance abatement. 148 The Second District found that holding a
mortgagee not in possession liable for the costs of abating a nuisance
would be an unconstitutional use of the police powers. 149 The Supreme
Court of Ohio agreed with this conclusion stating that a "mortgagee has
no ability to create or prevent a nuisance from arising on the mortgaged
property."150 This conclusion was based on the fact that a mortgagee,
prior to default, had no right of possession. 151 However, the Second
District went a step further and attempted to interpret the Dayton
ordinance so that it would be constitutional by reading "mortgagee" to
be "mortgagee in possession." 152 The Supreme Court of Ohio disagreed
with this construction, but did state that the ordinance could "have very
easily" included "mortgagee in possession" in its definition of parties
145.
146.
147.
148.
22, 1993).
149.
150.
151.
152.

See Hausman, 73 Ohio St. 3d at 676.
Levin, 161 Ohio St. at 520.
Lind, supra note 13, at 240.
Hausman v. City of Dayton, No. 13647, 1993 WL 541649 at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 2d Dist. Dec.
Id. at *25.
Hausman, 73 Ohio St.3d at 679.
Id.
Hausman, 1993 WL 541649, at *26.
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liable for the cost of nuisance abatement.153 By implication, the
Supreme Court of Ohio left unanswered the question of whether holding
mortgagees in possession liable for maintaining the property is
constitutional.
While the Supreme Court of Ohio stopped, the Second District
continued with the analysis.1 54 Citing a First District of Ohio Court of
Appeals case, the Second District explored the doctrine of mortgagee in
possession under Ohio law.' 55 The court found that since a mortgagee
cannot acquire physical control of property in Ohio without the consent
of the mortgagor, the only possession that a mortgagee can have is
constructive or virtual possession.' 56 The Second District found that if,
based upon the circumstances, a mortgagee acted in a way that "removes
from the hands of the mortgagor the management and control of the
estate," then the mortgagee has taken constructive possession and
therefore is a mortgagee in possession. 5 7
In the case of residential foreclosures, the mortgagor is generally not
aware of all the legal intricacies of the foreclosure process and legal
doctrines of property ownership. In cases in which the mortgagee
begins foreclosure but fails to transfer the property's title, the original
mortgagor may not know that legal title is still in his name.ss In a
situation where the actions of the mortgagee-e.g., initiating legal
proceedings or aggressive collection efforts-cause a mortgagor to
abandon a property, one could reason that the mortgagee has removed
from the hands of the mortgagor the management and control of the
estate and has become a mortgagee in possession. Therefore, at the
point of abandonment, a mortgagee becomes a trustee for the property
and is responsible for the cost of maintenance.
This extension of the common law doctrine of mortgagee in
possession is not unheard of. In fact, Judge Henry J. Nowak in Buffalo,
New York, is using nearly this exact same extension to confront the
vacancy issues arising from lenders' irresponsible foreclosure
practices.1 59
153. Hausman, 73 Ohio St. 3d at 678.
154. See Hausman, 1993 WL 541649, at *29-31.
155. Id. at 30 (citing Hyde Park Say. & Loan Co. v. Cowles, 168 N.E.2d 602 (Ohio Ct. App. 1st
Dist. 1960).
156. Id. (citing Hyde Park Say. & Loan Co., 168 N.E.2d at 350).
157. Id. at 31.
158. Lind, supra note 13, at 252 ("In fact, owners frequently think that the bankruptcy or
foreclosure proceeding terminates their ownership when, in fact, only a confirmed sale terminates their
ownership.").
159. Johnson, supra note 49, at 1195 (" ... Nowak contend[s] that by sending letters threatening
eviction or foreclosure against defaulting homeowners, the lenders have asserted control over the
property, triggering a responsibility to maintain the home after the homeowner vacates.").
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In conclusion, by extending the common law doctrine of mortgagee
in possession to cover foreclosing lenders whose suit or collection
practices lead to abandonment of the property, courts could provide
local jurisdictions with a tenable claim to hold lenders liable for the
costs of nuisance abatement arising from the property.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION

The serious problem of foreclosed, vacant homes negatively affects
neighborhoods across the country. The burden of dealing with the
problem cannot fall on any single party. On one hand, mortgage lenders
provide the financing necessary for many to have an opportunity for
home ownership, which can stabilize and improve neighborhoods. On
the other hand, local jurisdictions cannot be expected to shoulder the
costs of abandoned homes decaying in residential neighborhoods while
mortgage lenders dance around legal ownership to avoid liability.
This Comment discussed two separate paths to sharing the cost
burden of addressing vacant, foreclosed properties between mortgagees
and local jurisdictions. However, standing alone, neither fully solves
the problem. An extension of the common law doctrine of mortgagee in
possession would hold lenders accountable but would introduce much
uncertainty into the lending industry. In order to operate effectively and
efficiently from a business perspective, mortgage lenders must have
confidence in the expected costs associated with a loan. One of the
main sources of uncertainty with extension of the doctrine of mortgagee
in possession is that lenders are generally far removed from the property
undergoing foreclosure and often do not know if the property is vacant
or when it becomes vacant. A fair solution to this issue may lie in the
conjunctive use of a VPRO with reasonable maintenance requirements
and enforcement of lender liability under the doctrine of a mortgagee in
possession.
Under this proposed solution, a foreclosure could play out similar to
the following hypothetical. First, a lender would register with a local
jurisdiction before filing a foreclosure. The local jurisdiction would
inspect the property and determine the occupancy. If the property is
vacant, the local jurisdiction would notify the lender and require
compliance with the local VPRO by enforcement under the doctrine of
mortgagee in possession. If the property was occupied, the local
jurisdiction would be on alert to monitor the occupancy of the home as it
undergoes foreclosure. The local jurisdiction would be responsible for
alerting the lender if the property becomes unoccupied during the
foreclosure, which would trigger the lender's liability to maintain the
property according the VPRO maintenance standards. This would
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reduce the onus on lenders to determine vacancy before filing
foreclosures and would remove ambiguity concerning when liability for
property maintenance begins.
Additionally, the added burden of maintenance would incentivize
lenders to invest in upfront minor maintenance before costs snowball,
finish foreclosure actions through the sale to the next property owner,
and perhaps even renegotiate underwater loans or unmanageable loan
terms.
In conclusion, mortgagees need to contribute their fair share to
stemming the havoc their foreclosure practices have created in
neighborhoods across the country. In Ohio, which has felt the impacts
of those practices, this could be accomplished through a good faith
extension of the common law doctrine of mortgagee in possession or
through the enactment of local vacant property registration ordinances
targeting foreclosing lenders. However, a system with both of these
solutions working together could create a plausible resolution to the
problems of blight that would satisfy the legitimate demands of both
local governments and the mortgage lending industry.
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